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Very little of the thousands of hours of Mission Control audio on the website has been heard or documented. As you find moments of interest, post them here for discussion.

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Topics - MadDogBV

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16
Short but sweet one here. In his first shift in the MOCR as CAPCOM after the explosion, Joe Kerwin tells the crew to commence the planned yaw maneuver. Problem is the crew can't hear him.

I suspect Kerwin probably didn't get much sleep after the accident.  ;D

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=065:06:16&ch=7
Isolated Flight Director Loop: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=065:06:14&ch=50

17
INCO Ed Fendell puts through the idea to FLIGHT Glynn Lunney about saving power in the LM by turning off the power amplifier for the comm unit. It wasn't but a few hours ago that a test procedure also initiated by Fendell to bring up TM caused a significant loss of comm, so Lunney is quick to remind him of this. Thankfully, Fendell is undeterred.

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=064:43:08&ch=50

18
If you listen to the start of the FLIGHT loop of the Kranz shift just prior to the accident, then go all the way to the end, you'll notice there is discussion about how to manage the SHe problem on board the LM, in case the pressures are too high. It even gets to the point where Kranz has a meeting with the LM guys and some folks in SPAN on what steps need to be taken if the SHe pressures are too high, requiring the AFD to take over in the interim.

By the time Kranz returns, Haise has already entered the LM and has reported a nominal SHe pressure.

EECOM Sy Liebergot laughs about the amount of time and effort that went into creating a plan, and how it all turned out to be for nothing. The sense of relief and elation throughout the MOCR (at one point requiring Kranz to bark at the controllers to "keep the chatter down") is especially ironic given what happens an hour later.

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=054:52:55&ch=16

19
https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=051:18:06&ch=50

Five hours prior to "the problem" on Apollo 13, an interesting conversation between White FLIGHT, PROCEDURES and NETWORK. Kranz expresses his frustration about a new ASPO policy that on-site tapes at remote locations be shipped to Houston after 24 hours. Of course, this has no actual bearing on the disaster and ends up becoming a moot point shortly after the tank explosion.

20
https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=062:09:45&ch=50

Lunney gets into it with his flight controllers. Shortly after the disaster and the mental strain of the course-correction burn, Lunney is trying to get the crew into some semblance of PTC. However, SPAN is trying to come up with a new PTC procedure, which is causing delays in the process at a time when management of power and consumables is a priority. FLIGHT becomes progressively annoyed by this.

(Unfortunately, the TELMU/CONTROL loop is drowned out by the noise of the comm, otherwise I'd post that also.)

21
https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=060:05:41&ch=53

INCO Ed Fendell expresses his (rather understandable) frustrations with the PROCEDURES and TRACK officers after an attempt to establish tracking with the LM results in a lengthy loss of comm, which in turn results in flight director Glynn Lunney getting rather testy at INCO.

Most of the INCO channel around here (starting at 59:45:00) is worth listening to, to get an inside look at the comm disaster that took place, by way of the conversations between INCO, TRACK, and the Honeysuckle and Goldstone tracking stations. Although they do come up with a workaround, the poor INCO officer does spend the next several minutes lamenting the trouble that this new procedure got him into.  :)

22
https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=057:40:29&ch=16

EECOM's ECS cries out that the "surge tank's gotta come on" because the manifold pressure is dropping down to 27 Psi, putting the crew in danger, followed up by EPS gravely warning Clint Burton that a battery should be put on main A due to the O2 tank pressure dropping. This occurs amidst a heated argument between FLIGHT, GUIDO, CONTROL, and TELMU about whether or not the crew should do a P52 to align the LEM with the CSM.

23
General Discussion / Apollo 13 TELMU audio loop blank?
« on: March 15, 2020, 07:47:00 pm »
The TELMU audio loop for Apollo 13 during the time of the crisis (e.g. at the beginning of Lunney's shift in the MOCR at the roughly 57-hour mark) seems to be totally blank. I find this a bit hard to believe since at this point TELMU is extremely active in making sure Aquarius gets powered up to support the crew. Is this an error, or was the TELMU audio loop actually blank at this point in the mission?

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