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Very little of the thousands of hours of Mission Control audio on the website has been heard or documented. As you find moments of interest, post them here for discussion.

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Topics - MadDogBV

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46
EECOM Sy Liebergot gets a phone call from fellow EECOM John Aaron while working the White Flight shift about three hours before the accident. Sy recounts what he's been dealing with throughout the day, remarking that it's "just like the simulation". This ends up being a pretty helpful summary of what's been going on in his shift.

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=052:38:46&ch=16

47
During transearth coast, LMP Haise asks a question of CAPCOM Kerwin about what to do with bags of waste water, but he asks it in a relatively tactful fashion knowing that the air-to-ground conversations are likely being monitored by the world at large. Flight Director Lunney picks up on this immediately and brings the problem up with FAO.

Dr. Joe Kerwin is not as swift on the uptake.

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=092:59:29&ch=7

48
We all like hearing Lunney get ticked off. During the LM power transfer procedure, SPAN and EECOM posit the idea to FLIGHT of doing a main bus/battery procedure to verify that the main bus is working properly, effectively combining procedures. With little time to spare and last-minute input flooding in to change the procedures, he gets more and more torched.

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=092:41:52&ch=50

49
Hi there! Would there be any benefit to me transcribing the EECOM loops for Apollo 13 - for instance, starting at the beginning of Sy Liebergot's shift just before the accident occurred and then crossing into some of Clint Burton's shift - and then posting it in the "Apollo 13 Moments of Interest" board? I had been transcribing some of the shift and thought it might be of interest to some of the readers/listeners. There's a lot of interesting moments and discussions to be found in some of the flight controller loops, and having the transcript would be helpful in navigating through it. I have no problem putting it together, as I have both the software and equipment to run through it in fairly short order.

I'd attempt to transcribe the FIDO shift also, but as would be expected for anything in flight dynamics, there's a lot more jargon in there and in general it's a bit tougher to follow.

50
It has become apparent over the hours following the accident that power will be needed from the LM to the CSM in order to carry out crucial maneuvers for the PC+2 abort. Unfortunately, the procedure for doing this is becoming very lengthy, which FLIGHT Glynn Lunney comments on as TELMU gives his report to him.

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=065:12:52&ch=50

Lunney later relays this to CAPCOM Joe Kerwin. Kerwin is already a bit skeptical about having the crew do any unnecessary procedures. Earlier, he feuded with EECOM Liebergot about doing extra cryo-stirs. Not surprisingly, he is very audibly frustrated at the lengthening of the LM umbilical procedure.

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=065:15:56&ch=50

51
This is somewhat technical in nature but it does give an interesting glimpse into the day-to-day troubleshooting that EECOM engineers have to do in order to solve open issues. Jim from the back room chats with Sy Liebergot and Charlie Dumis (still on console from the previous shift) about the failure of a capacitance probe and how it might have occurred. Both are particularly impatient, given that it seems to be a re-explanation of details that they already know. Dumis* does give an amusing exclamation near the end of the conversation.

Eventually, Sy just tunes out and moves on to discussing another open issue with FLIGHT - fixing the quantity balance on the H2 tanks.

https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=049:37:46&ch=16

* Edit: After listening to the tape a few times, I'm pretty sure that it's George Conway and not Charlie Dumis who explodes "Bullshit!" at the end of the conversation.

52
CAPCOM Jack Lousma asks FLIGHT (Milt Windler) if he has recovery plans. Milt misunderstands at first and thinks that Lousma is joking around, but then as the conversation progresses, he realizes they are referring to the crew on board the spacecraft (since the MPL and AOL has been changing frequently throughout the flight).

Pago Pago, or Hawaii?

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=084:48:25&ch=8

Edit: Looking back at the clip, it sounds like Milt is laughing at Jack's Freudian slip of referring to him as "fright" instead of "flight", rather than the recovery plans inquiry. Most people in the business would probably agree that if anyone would be referred to as a fright director, it would likely be Kranz or Kraft.

53
Apollo 13 Moments of Interest / 056:12:37 RECOVERY gets ready to abort
« on: March 30, 2021, 02:37:41 pm »
Immediately after news of the O2 leak, RETRO is already preparing for the worst and getting abort procedures underway with RECOVERY coordinator Edward Bullock.

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=056:12:37&ch=32

RECOVERY does later dial up PACIFIC RECOVERY to lay down the law on a potential PC+2 abort and/or T+60 fast abort plan and ensure that the Navy ships are still in recovery range.

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=056:33:18&ch=32

54
Pretty self-explanatory. He's not explicitly identified as Jay, but the voice is unmistakably his. I haven't monitored the FIDO loops to determine if Jay was chatting to the backroom prior to this, though I gather there were multiple FIDO's and GUIDO's working the consoles after the accident occurred. He's not heard from again on the FLIGHT loop until Lunney's second shift at around 089 hours or so.

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=064:38:54&ch=7

Edit: He was actually on the FIDO loops a good while prior to this, to talk to SELECT specifically. Jay wanted to sort out some confusion regarding tracking requirements after Bill Boone scared the hell out of them by suggesting they might not have the transponder beacon for more than an hour at most.

55
Short but sweet one here. In his first shift in the MOCR as CAPCOM after the explosion, Joe Kerwin tells the crew to commence the planned yaw maneuver. Problem is the crew can't hear him.

I suspect Kerwin probably didn't get much sleep after the accident.  ;D

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=065:06:16&ch=7
Isolated Flight Director Loop: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=065:06:14&ch=50

56
INCO Ed Fendell puts through the idea to FLIGHT Glynn Lunney about saving power in the LM by turning off the power amplifier for the comm unit. It wasn't but a few hours ago that a test procedure also initiated by Fendell to bring up TM caused a significant loss of comm, so Lunney is quick to remind him of this. Thankfully, Fendell is undeterred.

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=064:43:08&ch=50

57
If you listen to the start of the FLIGHT loop of the Kranz shift just prior to the accident, then go all the way to the end, you'll notice there is discussion about how to manage the SHe problem on board the LM, in case the pressures are too high. It even gets to the point where Kranz has a meeting with the LM guys and some folks in SPAN on what steps need to be taken if the SHe pressures are too high, requiring the AFD to take over in the interim.

By the time Kranz returns, Haise has already entered the LM and has reported a nominal SHe pressure.

EECOM Sy Liebergot laughs about the amount of time and effort that went into creating a plan, and how it all turned out to be for nothing. The sense of relief and elation throughout the MOCR (at one point requiring Kranz to bark at the controllers to "keep the chatter down") is especially ironic given what happens an hour later.

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=054:52:55&ch=16

58
https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=051:18:06&ch=50

Five hours prior to "the problem" on Apollo 13, an interesting conversation between White FLIGHT, PROCEDURES and NETWORK. Kranz expresses his frustration about a new ASPO policy that on-site tapes at remote locations be shipped to Houston after 24 hours. Of course, this has no actual bearing on the disaster and ends up becoming a moot point shortly after the tank explosion.

59
https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=062:09:45&ch=50

Lunney gets into it with his flight controllers. Shortly after the disaster and the mental strain of the course-correction burn, Lunney is trying to get the crew into some semblance of PTC. However, SPAN is trying to come up with a new PTC procedure, which is causing delays in the process at a time when management of power and consumables is a priority. FLIGHT becomes progressively annoyed by this.

(Unfortunately, the TELMU/CONTROL loop is drowned out by the noise of the comm, otherwise I'd post that also.)

60
https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=060:05:41&ch=53

INCO Ed Fendell expresses his (rather understandable) frustrations with the PROCEDURES and TRACK officers after an attempt to establish tracking with the LM results in a lengthy loss of comm, which in turn results in flight director Glynn Lunney getting rather testy at INCO.

Most of the INCO channel around here (starting at 59:45:00) is worth listening to, to get an inside look at the comm disaster that took place, by way of the conversations between INCO, TRACK, and the Honeysuckle and Goldstone tracking stations. Although they do come up with a workaround, the poor INCO officer does spend the next several minutes lamenting the trouble that this new procedure got him into.  :)

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