Messages

31

Apollo 13 Moments of Interest / 057:53:58 Kamman and Hutchinson need quick and dirty answer on IMU heaters

« on: September 09, 2023, 11:03:38 am »

This is one of the greatest examples of having to evaluate quick decision-making during a crisis, in the midst of what is likely considered the apogee of peril during the Apollo 13 mission, minutes before an imminent shutdown of the CSM and the LM not yet being operational.

GNC Jack Kamman makes a call to an IMU heater expert to determine whether the heaters need to be powered up for the crew to return home safely. Then someone else jumps into the call in the nick of time to clarify the nature of the question. The person they are calling is probably Dick Freund, based on the dialogue in the call as well as the fact that he makes reference to "AC doing a study". That "AC" is ACDelco, a subsidiary of General Motors. They were the manufacturer of the IMU used inside the command module, and in the flight controller assignment list, Dick is identified as an employee of that company.

https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=057:53:58&ch=18

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Apollo 13 Moments of Interest / Re: 036:33:56 Neil Hutchinson chews out EECOM John Aaron

« on: September 09, 2023, 10:24:33 am »

Good point! As I went back and listened to some of the tapes, he indeed acknowledged and agreed to having the strip charts replicated on a Xerox rather than doing another playback to get the same data. Neil Hutchinson is certainly an experienced flight controller, having previously been a GUIDO before taking his current role in SPAN, so it's slightly amusing to see him struggle with something as trivial as strip charts.

He has a bit of an attitude too, based on his prior interactions with John Aaron before his complaint about the unwieldiness of the Xerox. And after all is said and done, they share this smart-ass dialogue exchange:

SPAN: "Forty-five minutes of backbreaking work."
EECOM: "We live and learn, don't we?"
SPAN: "I HOPE so! 🤨"

33

Apollo 13 Moments of Interest / -02:06:51 BOOSTER bungles abort command test, Skip gets testy

« on: September 08, 2023, 01:28:46 pm »

Well, this is a little unfair on BOOSTER. Based on subsequent dialogue, the abort commands weren't being transmitted due to a console selection issue - FIDO and FLIGHT's consoles were linked up to the spacecraft but not BOOSTER's. Although the commands are sent successfully shortly thereafter and FLIGHT Milt Windler attempts to pass it off as just a minor glitch, STC Skip Chauvin is clearly not satisfied and he continues to pursue the cause of the issue, specifically trying to rule out a spacecraft problem.

Based on subsequent dialogue on the FLIGHT loop, it sounds as if there may have been a phone call between Skip and Milt after the glitch to clear up the issue. It's unknown what the content of the call was, but one could guess that it likely wasn't a flattering assessment of RTC or BOOSTER's role in a usually routine command check.

FLIGHT loop: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=-02:07:00&ch=7
BOOSTER loop: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=-02:07:00&ch=47

34

General Discussion / Re: Apollo 13 Mission Ops Report - Sections of interest

« on: August 29, 2023, 12:04:12 pm »

ITEM 1 - Comm Problems

Three major INCO incidents occurred during the mission. These incidents went virtually unstated in the Flight Directors Report, even though the FDs on duty for each one were progressively annoyed with the INCOs' apparent incapability of resolving each issue. In two of the incidents, the scheduled controller was accompanied by a second INCO, Ed Fendell - you may know him as Captain Video - a former Air Force air traffic controller who knew his stuff. When the comm guys became aware of the deteriorating situation on board the CSM after the accident, Fendell was one of those called for reinforcements. You can tell just from listening to the FLIGHT loops from the LM lifeboat procedure all the way to the building of the Mailbox that he was in it for the long haul. As he put it in the Oral History: "The mission, it was really tiring, but you weren't tired. I think I worked three straight days without any sleep." Even then, he's right there during the re-entry shift, sitting next to Tom Hanchett at the INCO console.

But even if the mission was regarded in all respects as a total success and the communication problems went mostly undocumented by the Flight Directors, who wanted to praise their employees in every respect possible, you can tell from reading the mission ops report that Ed Fendell (and his friend in PROCEDURES, Jim Fucci) wanted to really put it to the simulation team for the inadequate training on how to deal with the INCO problems that occurred during the mission.

From INCO section on simulations:


From PROCEDURES section on simulations:


The flight director losing confidence in INCO is not a trivial matter either, particularly for performance of the mission. During the entry anomaly when they were forced to go to low bitrate after repeated problems with locking up with the CSM for uplinking a state vector and target load, INCO Tom Hanchett had told FLIGHT Gene Kranz that they were finally in the proper configuration to go back to high bitrate and speed up the uplinking. Kranz told Hanchett bluntly, "Let's not take a chance."

35

General Discussion / Apollo 13 Mission Ops Report - Sections of interest

« on: August 28, 2023, 09:01:27 am »

This thread will serve as a compilation of several interesting sections or pages from the Apollo 13 Mission Operations Report. That document was published after the completion of the mission, written by the flight controllers who were scheduled to work during the mission. It served the following purposes:

• Provided a debriefing from flight controllers regarding events and anomalies specific to their position.
• Allowed controllers to suggest recommendations to existing procedures in order to resolve future anomalies.
• Served as a repository for special documents that were used or created throughout the mission, such as the diagram for building the Mailbox (CSM-to-LM LiOH adapter), the modified re-entry checklist, and the LM power transfer.

The document is available for everyone's perusal from the Apollo 13 Flight Journal, and I encourage everyone to partake in it.

I'll post the first section of interest later today in this thread.

36

Apollo 13 Moments of Interest / Re: 140:03:43 RETRO Chuck Deiterich gets spooked by YAW

« on: August 18, 2023, 04:11:23 pm »

The only flight controller on the loops who seems to be the most calm and collected, during either the accident or the re-entry, is the GNC on the White Team, Buck Willoughby. And to your point... he was a former Major in the U.S. Marine Corps, an aviator just like the company he kept.

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Apollo 13 Moments of Interest / 140:03:43 RETRO Chuck Deiterich gets spooked by YAW

« on: August 17, 2023, 08:33:49 am »

Chuck Deiterich is quite a character, in a way that I think is underestimated by listening just solely to the Flight Director loops. When listening to the Flight Dynamics loops in particular during the re-entry phase, you can detect a great deal of anxiety and chariness about him in a way that tends to be somewhat charming. 😊

The below recording is just one of many instances in which his nervousness is on display when YAW asks him a question that sounds innocuous on paper, but which would understandably prompt panic under different circumstances. Given the proximity to entry interface and considering the fact they've already done a midcourse and an SM sep, their options for recovering from a mistake were greatly limited.

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=140:03:43&ch=19

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Apollo 13 Moments of Interest / Re: "We've got a good problem" but I forget where I heard it

« on: August 01, 2023, 02:40:55 pm »

I find the clashes weirdly entertaining too. When they are trying to do the last midcourse on the way to Earth, there's basically what amounts to a screaming match that breaks out on the RETRO loop between himself and GUIDO, over whether or not the spacecraft is rolled out of plane. It does fortunately resolve amicably -- thankfully for the crew...

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=137:18:21&ch=19

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Apollo 13 Moments of Interest / Re: "We've got a good problem" but I forget where I heard it

« on: July 28, 2023, 09:55:13 am »

Hey kendradog!

That was Clint Burton, the Black Team EECOM. They had already scrounged up a couple of DLOGs up to that point, but because they weren't sure that the data was high bit-rate and they had no clue what caused the explosion to begin with, he needed an even higher sample rate which could only be done through the FM/FM recorder. He was requesting it from Jim Fucci, PROCEDURES, but ultimately Fucci would be passing the request on to the COMP SUP who would be responsible for coordinating that. And yeah, he probably did think it was a real pain in the ass to do.

Link: 059:06:30 (PROCEDURES)

And that's actually not the first time Burton tried to request an FMFM from Fucci. He did so earlier in the mission as well, which resulted in a similarly annoyed response, although that one was easier to resolve.

Clint Burton had a reputation even among his backroom of being playback-happy, as did Sy Liebergot. Playbacks, while a useful form of data collection, were also a mild disruption to mission control for a number of technical reasons; it would disrupt other real-time data sources picked up by controllers in the MOCR and also meant a computer checkpoint (the 1960s equivalent of saving data) would have to be delayed if one was needed.

40

Apollo 13 Moments of Interest / Multiple times - "Listen to the air-to-ground!"

« on: July 27, 2023, 07:27:44 pm »

Every flight controller (with the occasional exception of the FIDO officer) was expected to listen to the air-to-ground loop any time that the crew started transmitting, so that the crew wouldn't have to waste time repeating themselves and also to ensure any urgent questions or comments were addressed. Any controller who repeatedly failed to do so would usually find themselves shown out of the MOCR with another controller to take their place.

But even on Apollo 13, some controllers would be caught flat-footed. Below is a list of links to instances in which FLIGHT reprimanded the controller for apparently failing to listen to the loop.

Link 1: 060:47:52 - Black FLIGHT (Lunney) to INCO (Scott)
Link 2: 073:24:16 - Gold FLIGHT (Griffin) to CONTROL (Wegener)
Link 3: 084:28:16 - Maroon FLIGHT (Windler) to FAO (Gardner)

And at about 139:39:11, a little bonus clip here where YAW (I think Pressley or Wells?) tells INCO (Hanchett) to listen to the air-to-ground during an exchange that essentially amounts to YAW saying "We're too busy to do your work, INCO."

41

General Discussion / Re: ASTP considered an Apollo mission?

« on: July 13, 2023, 10:22:33 am »

From its conceptual beginnings in the mind of Abe Silverstein to Apollo 17's final splashdown, the Apollo mission and its mission schedule was nominally to do one thing and one thing only: put men on the Moon and bring them home before 1970. All of the missions prior to Apollo 11 were subordinated to a plan involving numerous milestones required to accomplish that objective. Each mission (even as the schedule was reconfigured for Apollo 8's unplanned lunar journey) was meant to be a new piece in the puzzle - a working Saturn V, a working CSM, a working LM, a lunar orbit, a rendezvous between the CM and LM, and a demonstration of a nominal landing. The missions that came after 11 were then to take advantage of the scientific opportunities that the landings could yield, and they anticipated a much longer and detailed schedule before the program was cut.

For this reason, I think even those flights that used Apollo hardware couldn't be considered true Apollo missions, as Apollo was an operation with distinct objectives where the goal of the mission was just as much a part of the paradigm as the hardware itself.

42

General Discussion / Re: Apollo 12 launch EECOM loop?

« on: July 12, 2023, 11:59:39 am »

As I understand it, a big NSF grant was awarded to begin the digitization process. The grant was recently extended to August 2024, so it's still in progress.

https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2016725&HistoricalAwards=false

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Apollo 13 Moments of Interest / Re: Looking for Ed Fendell, who is playing softball

« on: July 08, 2023, 07:15:25 am »

Nicely done! Just to fill in a few names, Fucci first rings up Alan Glines who was the INCO on duty during the first half of the White Team's shift.

The other unnamed person Fucci is trying to track down is Tom Hanchett, another INCO, who wasn't due to come back on duty until later on in the Black Team shift. He does eventually get a hold of him too and tells him to come in. It's clear he wants to get as much support as possible for what must be an overwhelmed Gary Scott.

44

General Discussion / Re: Listening to multiple loops efficiently

« on: July 06, 2023, 08:50:47 am »

Most if not all of the loops include the FLIGHT Director loop and the GOSS (air-to-ground) loop because those were the loops that the controller had "punched up" (meaning, listening in through their headset) at their console, and in the MOCR, you put yourself in a lot of deep trouble by not listening if either of those two loops demanded your attention. You might notice on some loops during the accident, particularly EECOM's, that certain voices go up and down in volume. This is because the controller is changing which loop is louder and which is quieter in real time, so they can amplify information that's immediately pertinent to them and filter out chatter that they don't need to hear at the moment.

Controllers each have their own loop through which they can be contacted as well. During the most climactic moments of the accident, Jim Fucci (PROCEDURES) accidentally punches off his own loop, resulting in EECOM, FIDO and GUIDO later trying to contact him but not getting through until Steve Bales rings up INCO to nudge him.

The reason you can't hear the backroom loops by themselves is because they aren't considered a MOCR loop but an SSR loop, and the SSR loops aren't included in the MOCR tape recordings unfortunately. I think SPAN also listens in on the SSR loops but they tend to have FLIGHT punched up as well, so that makes it a bit more tricky.

And yeah, unfortunately if you want to listen to multiple loops at a time, it's probably best to download them off of Archive.org and edit them with Audacity or GoldWave to remove the silence and/or splice them together as I have done.

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Apollo 13 Moments of Interest / 116:19:06 Lunney spars with trench over final midcourse time

« on: July 04, 2023, 02:08:55 pm »

This is a follow-up to this thread posted earlier by Ben Feist. In the original thread, Lunney had an argument with RETRO Chuck Dieterich and FIDO Dave Reed (nominally the lead RETRO and FIDO on this mission) about having the hatch open or closed during LM SEP. Lunney eventually got his way there since the higher-ups had firmly agreed that the tunnel would be pressurized with the hatch closed, as they had done on Apollo 10.

Here, he returns an hour later to discuss moving the midcourse correction to an earlier time, based upon feedback from John Young (backup CDR) over the re-entry procedures being too crowded -- although this is less a discussion and more a circus tamer fending off angry lions. This time, the flight dynamics branch prevails, but only due to the combined feedback of the other astronaut pilots in the MOCR (off the loop) and Lunney's agnosticism on the issue.

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=116:19:06&ch=50

Edit: As a note of interest, they do eventually succeed at de-crowding the re-entry timeline, but primarily as a result of taking advantage of a newly-developing situation. This is because Maroon FLIGHT Milt Windler makes an executive decision at 133:21:53~ to power up the PGNS three hours early as part of a larger effort to warm the crew up. They were able to do this thanks to the wide water and power margins that they had accumulated for themselves as a result of their brutally marginal power profiles. Because of this, they were able to tweak the re-entry procedures (see 135:45:50) around having the PGNS available early.