This forum is for discussion about content found on https://apolloinrealtime.org 

Very little of the thousands of hours of Mission Control audio on the website has been heard or documented. As you find moments of interest, post them here for discussion.

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Apollo 13 Moments of Interest / 056:40:24 RETRO Spencer nixes direct abort
« Last post by MadDogBV on September 05, 2024, 11:09:59 am »
Pretty self-explanatory. During the height of the crisis, RETRO Bobby Spencer has run the numbers on how much it would cost to do a direct abort at T+60 - 10,000 ΔV (delta V, or available velocity). The numbers he gives to Maroon FLIGHT Milt Windler are unrealistic. Milt doesn't realize this at first as he tells Bobby "work on that", but soon they quickly come to the conclusion that it's not doable. Even the subsequent conversation involving 7,000 ΔV implies that they would have the SPS engine for an undocked burn.

They will not.

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=056:40:24&ch=19
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At 133:00:49 GET during a last-minute review of the CSM entry checklist, Maroon FLIGHT Milt Windler tells RETRO Tom Weichel that the P-27 updates for a state vector and target load should only be done if absolutely necessary due to shortness of time. Since the order came directly from FLIGHT, RETRO just "rogers" it. But later on, it's clear that some dialogue is happening off the loops regarding how problematic this thinking is. In particular, YAW Gran Paulis points out that the crew doesn't even need to do anything while the loads are being submitted. He surmises Milt Windler must have thought that some reading-up of PADs were necessary to the crew.

FIDO Jay Greene, rather boldly and concisely, suggests that Paulis assumed too much too quickly about Milt's thought process.

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=133:06:41&ch=20
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During the LM jettison, in a brief conversation with YAW Will Pressley, Jack Garman warns him that "transience in separation" might cause a CSM gimbal lock to occur. He's referring specifically to oscillations in attitude as a result of the delta-V imparted on the CSM in separation. The deadband isn't as much of a concern since the spacecraft is in a 5-degree deadband; thus, the middle gimbal angle is moving between 10 and 20 degrees from gimbal lock.

Later, one of the AGC support personnel calls the gimbal lock warning, but because his voice on the loop is so faint, it's missed and it's a full 3 or 4 seconds before anyone from the ground brings this to the attention of FLIGHT/CAPCOM. By that point, it's already too late and Swigert has already gone to direct control to correct this, but Garman does take this as an opportunity to remind Pressley of his concerns.

Link:
Before gimbal lock - https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=141:15:37&ch=22
Gimbal lock - https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=141:30:14&ch=22
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In "13 More Things That Saved Apollo 13", it notes that Jim Lovell put the Apollo 13 spacecraft 90 degrees out of the desired jettison attitude (LM yaw, CSM/body roll), since LM yaw was an out-of-plane orientation and going to the PAD attitude would have put the spacecraft in gimbal lock. In looking at the air-to-ground and PAO loop, there is no indication that there's any issue with this, as CAPCOM Joe Kerwin reassures Lovell that the yaw isn't critical.

In the trench, it's a much different story.

After Swigert's fantastic P52 which bypassed the need for a sun-moon alignment, there was a frantic effort by both the ground and the crew to get the LM jettisoned. As a result, Kranz never got a formal "go" from GUIDO Ken Russell for the jettison attitude. In the chaos, the "go" came from CONTROL Hal Loden, which created a stir in the trench. GUIDO pointed this out to FIDO Dave Reed and warned him that CDR Jim Lovell was bailing out of the LM, per the air-to-ground. Reed made a remark that would have been unthinkable coming from any other FIDO: "I'm gonna jam him (Lovell) back in!"

What follows is a very confused series of events, and it really benefits to listen to the whole loop from 141:02 to 141:10, as it progresses from the trench bickering and arguing over the safety of the jettison attitude (the normally cool and professional Dave Reed audibly vacillates on whether the attitude is safe), with FAO and CONTROL jumping in to provide their input. In the end, the question is brought to FLIGHT, Gene Kranz, with the eventual determination that they have no choice but to accept the new jettison attitude. Either way, this is arguably the moment of greatest panic throughout the entry prep for the Trench.

Quote
FIDO: We need to have Jim take the LM to the FDAI angles that we gave him on the LM jettison pad!
FLIGHT: How far off is he?
RETRO: Flight--he's gonna jettison the service module to the north--I mean, the LM to the north. We don't want him to the north, we want him to the south.

One thing of note about this exchange is that Kerwin asks if the concern is about the impact on the landing point of the atomic fuel cask (as mentioned in the article), but RETRO Chuck Deiterich explains, as he does in the article, that they simply want to ensure that the LM and CSM don't collide in the jettison. This is supported by the fact that Dave Reed later checks the relative motion of both spacecrafts with the new attitude, and verifies that both will be okay.

Link:
FIDO - https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=141:02:53&ch=20
GUIDO - https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=141:02:53&ch=21
CONTROL - https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=141:02:53&ch=57
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Apollo 13 Moments of Interest / Re: 072:05:17 - Woman's voice
« Last post by zootboy on August 03, 2024, 03:09:16 pm »
Some additional discussion about the source of the issue on NETWORK:

https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=072:10:20&ch=11

https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=072:16:41&ch=11

Mention of a patching issue in the Madrid microwave link, and the fact that they switched to an alternate channel while they monitor the original channel to see if the crosstalk reappears.
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General Discussion / Re: Other Apollo Missions
« Last post by Kasper on July 31, 2024, 08:47:42 am »
Any Apollo 16 update? Or is it never going to happen?
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During the read-up of the CSM entry checklist to Jack Swigert, Ken Mattingly deviates from the checklist momentarily to talk to Jack Swigert about how to bring the computer out of standby.

AGC specialist Jack Garman, who had already been grousing with Steve Bales earlier in the day about ensuring that the computer procedures were properly detailed, explodes with exasperation upon hearing this, as he believes that Swigert is being fed incorrect information. Even Swigert himself seems to sound confused; as Garman explains to Bales, since the computer would have been powered up for a while by this time and would have already gone to standby, the 37 06 would not come up automatically as Mattingly is claiming.

Later, Garman stalwartly predicts that Swigert is going to get to this point in the checklist and then call down to Houston with a complaint that the computer doesn't work.

Garman later turns out to be correct.

URL: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=126:41:26&ch=22
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A follow-up post for those who were interested in the actual nitty-gritties of how the flight controllers were planning to mitigate the SHe problem. Here's a briefing from Jay Greene to the SELECT on duty (John "Al" Layton) at 107:45 GET:

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=107:45:53&ch=20
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A serious amount of documentation (available here on page 118 of the PDF, and here as a separate document) was churned out by the Test Division in trying to figure out why the high-gain antenna failed to lock up with the Apollo 13 spacecraft during the TV pass at 55 hours. In both documents, the specific cause of the antenna failure was not fully identified, although it did note that it was not a manufacturing defect and that the failure likely occurred after transportation from the manufacturing plant.

EECOM Sy Liebergot, listening in to INCO struggling to lock up the high-gain with the spacecraft, calls up the EPS personnel in his backroom to let them know how the high-gain antenna may have been broken - and it's a surprisingly simple explanation.

Even during the Apollo program, accidents did happen!

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=055:06:23&ch=16
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During a briefing session by FLIGHT Glynn Lunney on the Black Team shift immediately following the accident, off-duty CONTROL Bob Carlton joins the conversation to give the MOCR flight controllers, and not incidentally Glynn himself, the straight talk on just how austere a power/water profile they will need to adhere to in order to get the crew home safely. This chilling opening dialogue really drives home just how grim the situation was:

CONTROL: Glenn, the guys in the back are running this water profile. Right now it looks like it's coming in real tight, the water itself.
FLIGHT: Yeah? Assuming we stay at this level from now on?
CONTROL: Negative. Assuming we power down post PC2.

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=064:16:26&ch=50
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