This forum is for discussion about content found on https://apolloinrealtime.org 

Very little of the thousands of hours of Mission Control audio on the website has been heard or documented. As you find moments of interest, post them here for discussion.

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Apollo 13 Moments of Interest / Re: 072:05:17 - Woman's voice
« Last post by zootboy on August 03, 2024, 03:09:16 pm »
Some additional discussion about the source of the issue on NETWORK:

https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=072:10:20&ch=11

https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=072:16:41&ch=11

Mention of a patching issue in the Madrid microwave link, and the fact that they switched to an alternate channel while they monitor the original channel to see if the crosstalk reappears.
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General Discussion / Re: Other Apollo Missions
« Last post by Kasper on July 31, 2024, 08:47:42 am »
Any Apollo 16 update? Or is it never going to happen?
33
During the read-up of the CSM entry checklist to Jack Swigert, Ken Mattingly deviates from the checklist momentarily to talk to Jack Swigert about how to bring the computer out of standby.

AGC specialist Jack Garman, who had already been grousing with Steve Bales earlier in the day about ensuring that the computer procedures were properly detailed, explodes with exasperation upon hearing this, as he believes that Swigert is being fed incorrect information. Even Swigert himself seems to sound confused; as Garman explains to Bales, since the computer would have been powered up for a while by this time and would have already gone to standby, the 37 06 would not come up automatically as Mattingly is claiming.

Later, Garman stalwartly predicts that Swigert is going to get to this point in the checklist and then call down to Houston with a complaint that the computer doesn't work.

Garman later turns out to be correct.

URL: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=126:41:26&ch=22
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A follow-up post for those who were interested in the actual nitty-gritties of how the flight controllers were planning to mitigate the SHe problem. Here's a briefing from Jay Greene to the SELECT on duty (John "Al" Layton) at 107:45 GET:

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=107:45:53&ch=20
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A serious amount of documentation (available here on page 118 of the PDF, and here as a separate document) was churned out by the Test Division in trying to figure out why the high-gain antenna failed to lock up with the Apollo 13 spacecraft during the TV pass at 55 hours. In both documents, the specific cause of the antenna failure was not fully identified, although it did note that it was not a manufacturing defect and that the failure likely occurred after transportation from the manufacturing plant.

EECOM Sy Liebergot, listening in to INCO struggling to lock up the high-gain with the spacecraft, calls up the EPS personnel in his backroom to let them know how the high-gain antenna may have been broken - and it's a surprisingly simple explanation.

Even during the Apollo program, accidents did happen!

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=055:06:23&ch=16
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During a briefing session by FLIGHT Glynn Lunney on the Black Team shift immediately following the accident, off-duty CONTROL Bob Carlton joins the conversation to give the MOCR flight controllers, and not incidentally Glynn himself, the straight talk on just how austere a power/water profile they will need to adhere to in order to get the crew home safely. This chilling opening dialogue really drives home just how grim the situation was:

CONTROL: Glenn, the guys in the back are running this water profile. Right now it looks like it's coming in real tight, the water itself.
FLIGHT: Yeah? Assuming we stay at this level from now on?
CONTROL: Negative. Assuming we power down post PC2.

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=064:16:26&ch=50
37
The BOOSTER engineer (as yet unnamed) reports to a bemused FIDO Jay Greene that it's no longer possible to command to the S-IVB to change its trajectory, and both the guidance platform and computer on board have broken down. He delivers this with report with a demeanor not unlike that of someone whose car has just broken down for the last time.

Later, he reports this to SELECT who is already having difficulty calculating its trajectory due to the noisy Doppler data. They're even more thrilled to discover that the APS (ascent propulsion system) thrusters are still firing and producing rates.

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=019:19:14&ch=20
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CONTROL Larry Strimple is working his second mission in the MOCR after having been backroom support in the LM SSR for several missions. Maroon Flight Milt Windler has just floated the very, very undesirable prospect over the flight loop of having to periodically (every hour on the hour) fire a 10-second ullage of the DPS in order to alleviate the supercritical helium tank. Obviously, this would wreak havoc on the spacecraft's trajectory, since Aquarius is currently on what is essentially a free-return trajectory with no PGNS, no AGS, and very little tracking data.

It seems CONTROL isn't as worried about this as the rest of the flight controllers are, as FIDO Bill Boone and RETRO Tom Weichel give Larry a taste of just how hard it is to be a flight controller during an anomaly situation.

Link: https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=107:05:24&ch=20
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The sarcastic, singy-songy (if a bit sleepy) tone of this remark from FIDO Jay Greene to SELECT John Layton really drives home all of the difficult, sometimes hurried, oftentimes no-win choices that the flight controllers had to make, especially from a data and telemetry standpoint. There were several major decisions made over the past two days, including whether to power down the S-BAND transponder, when to power up the ranging, etc., and many of these decisions involved a lot of intense negotiation between dynamics, systems, and data branches. So you can just imagine Greene's elbow on the console as he leans his head on his hand, rolling his eyes, as he has to tell Layton it's time to make yet another decision.

Certainly it's not a trivial decision in this case: From this point in the mission, they have roughly 36 hours until EI (entry interface, the time at which the spacecraft programmatically enters Earth's atmosphere). With new procedures and new checklists that have to be devised, they have to cram simulations of both the LM and CSM, sometimes integrated, into this short time span to ensure that the procedures work in practice as they do on paper.

In order to make the sims work, they need to also simulate the data. One can only imagine the computational requirements for flying an Apollo mission in one floor of the MOCR and simulating the same Apollo mission on a separate floor. The problem that Jay presents to Al is one of timing and logistics. Luckily, they both quickly come to a consensus on what to do.

https://apolloinrealtime.org/13/?t=106:58:21&ch=20
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It's ironic indeed that Jack has this discussion; during the Black Team post-accident shift, he admits to a controller (I think someone in SPAN) that this is one of the most frightening moments he's ever been in, in his life. It's probably the only time you hear a controller admit this on a recorded loop.

These sorts of phone calls happen all over the place during the most quiet periods of translunar coast, which is quite amusing and reveals a heretofore unseen "human side" of the flight controllers. During the Gold Team shift at around ~46:00 GET, EECOM Charlie Dumis has a lengthy phone conversation with a woman (her name might be mentioned in the transcript) who went on a road trip through New Mexico. During the same Black Team shift as mentioned in the OP, FIDO Bill Stoval also makes a few calls, including one to Dave Reed.

The mushy phone calls definitely decrease in frequency after 55 GET.
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